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ODP-81-593
SAF-E290-81

7 MAY 1981

SAFE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications

VIA : Director of Data Processing, o/ ~~DIJ~~

FROM : [REDACTED]
Director, Consolidated SAFE Project Office/ODP

SUBJECT : Letter of Agreement with NSA

Reference : A. NSA Letter, Serial: N/0574, dated 3 June 1980
B. OC-M80-084, dated 5 February 1980

1. During the past few months, several meetings were held with NSA concerning; a. the introduction of a Cryptographic Ignition Key (CIK) for the Cryptographic Module (CM), and b. changes in the cryptographic delivery schedule to meet the revised SAFE Project Plan. Both of these changes will alter the existing agreement with NSA for the SAFE COMSEC system development. (C) 3d3

2. It is our understanding that mutually acceptable contractor engineering changes have been completed to accommodate both of these important developments. The specific details of this joint effort are as follows:

A.

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B.

C.

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
NSA Review Completed.

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F.

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G.

H.

[redacted]

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3. It is requested that the above information be forwarded to NSA for their concurrence. If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact Mr. [redacted] on secure extension [redacted]

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[redacted]

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cc: C/ED/ODP via DD/P/ODP

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N/0574
3 June 1980

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Director of Communications
Office of Communications
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Sir:

(U) Please refer to the following:

a. (U) NSA Letter, Serial: S4/0004, dated 16 January 1978,
and Enclosure thereto.

b. (U) CIA Letter, OC-M80-084, Subject: COMSEC System
Development for Project SAFE (U), dated 5 February 1980.

(U) We have established a high-priority R&D program to support the
SAFE project. Our development has been based on our original proposal
(Reference a.) and the schedule that we jointly agreed to in October 1978.

(C) On 27 March 1980, we held a management-level meeting to discuss
our current status and your "revised requirements." At that time, we
jointly agreed to maintain our current COMSEC approach and schedule.
We also agreed that there would be no specific TEMPEST requirements
placed on the Cryptographic Module (CM)

(C) Since the 27 March 1980 meeting, we have been investigating
alternatives for expediting deliveries of the Key Generator Units
(KGUs) to the August 1981 time frame. It now appears that we may be
able to deliver X-2 models starting in August 1981 at the rate of
one per month. However, we will not be able to adequately assess the
KGU X-2 until after the KGU Critical Design Review (CDR) in
June 1980 and the X-2 interface testing in July 1980. Assuming that
those two events are successfully completed on time, an expedited
delivery of X-2 models appears reasonable.

(C) We are now beginning the contractual actions to pursue this
approach. Delivery of X-2 models will be provided
as soon as possible. We will provide your people
with the X-2 as soon as possible. We will work with your COMSEC office to determine an interface approach
for the X-2 and a delivery schedule. The X-2 will be delivered
as soon as possible.

CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
REVIEW ON 3 June 2000

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Serial: N/0574

Sincerely,

Howard E. Rosenblum
HOWARD E. ROSENBLUM
Deputy Director, NSA
for
Communications Security

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OC-1180-184
12 MAR 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Data Processing

FROM: [REDACTED]

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Director of Communications

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Equipment Requirements for
Project SAFE (U/AIUO)

REFERENCES: A. ODP-O-63 (SAF-E-015-80), dated 11 Jan 80
B. OC-M-80-084, dated 5 Feb 80
C. OCCS-M-80-047, dated 31 Jan 80
D. PSD/OS Memo to CSPO, dated 28 Jan 80

1. As requested in Reference A, the Agency requirements for the cryptographic communications subsystem for Project SAFE have been forwarded to NSA as Reference B. Initial informal feedback from NSA indicates that we have succeeded in obtaining management level attention to our concerns regarding COMSEC requirements and scheduling. It is important that we keep these requirements highly visible within NSA. Therefore, in the near future we plan to schedule, in close coordination with the Consolidated SAFE Project Office (CSPO), the management level meeting between our Agency and NSA requested in paragraph 4 of Reference B. We view this as the first in a series of such meetings to keep various schedules on track. [REDACTED]

2. In regard to most of the concerns voiced in Reference A, we believe these can be worked out in close coordination between ourselves and NSA in conjunction with [REDACTED] and NSA 25X1 contractors. Some tradeoffs are bound to occur in a program of such great magnitude as SAFE. However, we are prepared to assist you to the extent possible in minimizing any schedule delays and in protecting our Agency equities in this matter. The status of your areas of concern is as follows:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Cryptographic Equipment Requirements for Project
SAFE (U/AIUO)

b. Cryptographic Module (CM): Meetings with NSA, [redacted] CSPO, and Agency COMSEC representatives have al- 25X1 ready been held. After obtaining a better understanding of the proposed terminal/BIU design concepts, we believe the CM can be installed either within the terminal or the BIU without creating a TEMPEST problem. However, to accommodate a variety of terminals and other long-term BUS requirements, placing the CM in the BIU would appear to be the better choice. It is our understanding that the CSPO will ask [redacted] to cost 25X1 out the two options.

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d. SAFE Contingency Plan: The 1978 decision to go BLACK for SAFE was made jointly by all concerned with the project after reviewing the alternatives. Because the primary reason for the BLACK architecture was to alleviate inherent problems of maintaining

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SUBJECT: Cryptographic Equipment Requirements for Project
SAFE [redacted]

physical security for a RED system, approval of
the Office of Security is required as a first
step in any consideration for interim RED oper-
ation of SAFE. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Attachments:

References B, C, & D

cc: OS/ISSG
OS/PSD

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